

This unity of consciousness argument for dualism, if successful, shows that a complex state of awareness can only be experienced by an immaterial soul. Premise (4) seems to be the weakest in the argument. Its denial allows the attribution of S_2 to a composite object, such as a human body. Premise (5) is true because it seems unlikely that a physical simple is the subject of a complex phenomenal awareness. For example, I am simultaneously pressing computer keys, watching text appear on the screen, and hearing tiny clicks. It seems unlikely that even one of these sensations is a property of a physical simple. Hasker argues that even if individual simples might be aware of some of his visual field, all of these simples being simultaneously aware of some portion of the field cannot constitute a unified awareness.

Emergentism

Some find an appeal to emergent properties attractive as a solution to the Physicalist's problems with the unity of consciousness argument. They happily endorse emergent properties and/or substances. O'Connor defends the view that properties can arise due to the activity of a system of simples that are inexplicable in terms of the properties of the simples and their relations.⁵

These emergent properties are not reducible to the activity of simples, without being trivially reducible to it. We can capture this thought in the following definition.

(E-property) Property P is emergent iff P depends upon simples $(x_1 \dots x_n)$ and some of the intrinsic and relational properties of $(x_1 \dots x_n)$ for its existence, but is not logically (or trivially) reducible to any of the intrinsic or relational properties of $(x_1 \dots x_n)$.

PR is inconsistent with the existence of emergent properties as defined by E-property. Hasker attempts to resolve this tension, contending that consciousness represents an emergent property that belongs to an emergent immaterial substance. This immaterial soul originates due to the complex causal activity of the body at a certain stage of development. The soul requires the causal activity of the body (or a suitable substitute) for its continued existence. Once this soul arises it is supposed to exhibit a downward causal influence on the body that is inexplicable apart from agent causation.⁶

Hasker offers the magnetic field as a helpful analogy, saying, "as a magnet generates its magnetic field, so the brain generates its field of consciousness."⁷ The activity of a cluster of simples arranged in the proper way produces and sustains a magnetic field. However, we may imagine that a magnetic field exhibits an influence on those simples by arranging them in ways they would not otherwise be without the influence of the field.⁸ A magnetic field can also exist (at least momentarily) if the magnet is removed or replaced. Likewise, it is possible for an emergent soul to exist apart from the body that causes it – perhaps if another body replaces the original, or perhaps through the causal activity of an omnipotent being.⁹

Hasker preserves PR because the existence of the soul supposedly remains entirely explicable in terms of the causal activity of simples. This explanation requires the existence of emergent laws that are unforeseeable until the proper complexity arises.¹⁰ The causal powers of the simples, which the emergent law

their bodies, and have unified phenomenal consciousness. From premises of that sort it follows that persons are composite objects.

Some, such as Dennett, argue that

state [x and y].¹⁸ Therefore, the friend of phenomenal unity must choose between rejecting the principle of reducibility and accepting the existence of immaterial substances.

Composition and Vagueness

There is an influential argument that purports to show that if composition is restricted, then it is sometimes vague whether or not a composite exists. If all the parts of an object are sequentially removed, the vagueness argument states, no determinate point will show when the object ceases to exist. Thus, its existence sometimes becomes metaphysically vague.¹⁹ But, it is assumed that existence is never vague because 'for any x, either x exists or x does not exist' is a necessary truth. Therefore, the vagueness argument concludes, composition is not restricted. Lewis, Van Inwagen, and Sider agree that this difficulty results from the inherent vagueness of organic parthood.²⁰

Merricks, a friend of restricted composition, offers a skillful defense of the emergentist view of composite organisms. He argues that if a composite object has an E-property, such as consciousness, and it is not vague whether or not it has the

Emergentism and Origin


Emergentism and emergent dualism share an important feature: both views posit an asymmetric dependence between physical simples and a person. On Hasker's view, the existence of the immaterial soul depends causally upon the material simples associated with the body.²² So, the soul cannot exist in the absence of this causal activity. It seems that Hasker is committed to the soul's emergence essentially depending upon the causal activity of specific material simples. To see this, consider possible worlds W_1 and W_2 , which remain identical up until time t . In W_1 Sam's soul S arises at a time t from the collective

determination is impossible because Hasker contends that the soul is spatially co-extensive with at least some of the material simples upon which it depends.²³ None of ABC or XYZ spatially overlaps, therefore, ABC and XYZ give rise to spatially distinct souls. Spatial distinctness is sufficient for distinctness. It is impossible for Sam's soul to be identical to two distinct things, so W_3 is impossible. Hence, Sam's soul necessarily emerges from the causal activity of a unique aggregate of material simples.

Kripke expresses a similar notion in *Naming and Necessity*: "If a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any other matter."²⁴ For example, if a table is made of some particular hunk of wood, then it is impossible for that particular table to have been made from any other hunk of wood. Referring to Queen Elizabeth, Kripke also queries, "How could a person originating from different parents, from a totally different sperm and egg, be *Queen Elizabeth*?"²⁵

A Haskerian soul has its origin necessarily in the causal activity of a specific aggregate of material simples. So, it seems clear that it could not have had its origin in the activity of any other material simples. But perhaps the emergent dualist could argue that although no other material simples could have originated S, an immaterial omnipotent being could originate S. The previous argument against over-determination, which relies on spatial distinctness, fails to rule out God. Consider a scenario identical to Scenario 1, with the exception that God causes S* to exist instead of XYZ.

Scenario 2



Let a "D-substance" designate a substance that asymmetrically depends upon another substance for existence at some time during its career. Let "DD-substance" (double-dependent being) designate a substance that asymmetrically depends for its existence upon a D-substance at sometime during its career.

- D1. If God exists, then God is necessarily neither a D-substance nor a DD-substance
- D2. If God exists, then ABC are necessarily D-substances
- D3. If God exists, then S is necessarily a DD-substance
- D4. If God exists, then S* is necessarily a D-substance

D1 is a necessary truth. D2 is true because God is able to cause ABC to exist or fail to exist. D3 is true because, S causally depends upon ABC at sometime during its existence and S depends upon God. D4 is true because S* causally depends only upon God.

If the existence of a Haskerian soul is possibly causally over-determined, then there is some possible world W_{3B} in which ABC causes S to exist and God causes S* to exist, and S and S* are identical. However,

- D5. S and S* have distinct essential properties, and so, are distinct.

It is not immediately clear that D5 is true. Although, I'm inclined to accept that being a D-substance or being a DD-substance are essential properties, the opponent of D5 might advocate the contingency of these dependency

no point in time is essential to a thing's existence. Therefore, if a substance is an essentially DD-substance, its double dependency relation emerges at its origin. An omnipotent being could not generate a particular magnetic field without first creating a particular magnet. Likewise, God's attempt to create Sam's soul S without creating ABC would result in a counterfeit duplicate.

Kripke's insight, that the unique origin of a substance is necessary f

decide between taking all on all of the peculiarities and problems of emergent dualism or rejecting PR (as Merricks does), then rejecting PR is the best alternative.

¹ Sellars, Wilfrid. "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in _____, _____ (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 27.

² Merricks, Trenton. "Composition and Vagueness," _____ 114, no. 455 (July, 2005): 629.

³ Ibid.

⁴ William Hasker offers a slightly more sophisticated version of the argument in _____.

²¹ Merricks. "Composition and Vagueness." 628.

²² It isn't clear just which material simples the mind is causally dependent upon. Candidates may include the brain, the nervous system, the body, or simples in the environment that causally