

I. Introduction

Advocates of the extended mind have argued that human cognitive and agential capacities are not only *embodied* and move beyond one's skin into the external environment, *embedding* themselves in the environment, but also are *extended* into that environment so that a thinking, cognizing entity is constituted not only by the embodied mind but also by an embedding environment.¹ Brain, body and environment form a thinking, cognizing entity. The mind has super-sized itself! Consider, for instance, the use of notebooks, computers, the Internet and I phones and situations in which you and friends make plans for the evening. Our world is increasingly a world of embodied, embedded, and extended epistemic agential systems. Call this phenomenon 3E-ness.²

In this paper, I propose and argue for a version of 3E-ness that to my knowledge advocates of 3E-ness have paid less attention to, that is, the phenomenon of WE-ness, the extension of cognitive agential agents to form a plural agent, a WE.³ This is surprising for at least two reasons. Common sense and ordinary discourse abound with talk of plural agents -- corporations and nations, we and us, and they and them.⁴ Moreover, there is a highly developed analytic philosophical literature on social action, plural subjects and joint intentionality.⁵

To motivate the discussion of WE-ness, I start with Clark and Chalmers well known thought experiment concerning cognitive extension, presenting an until now unrevealed back-
~~story on Otto and his notebook.~~ Next, I sketch a scientifically based ontology that include

of normative and

Otto no longer recognizes many of his friends. Indeed, he thinks that the few that he does recognize are always angry with him.

The lesson of the back-story is clear. Otto's cognitive capacities in their prime were extended well beyond the minimal kind of extension involved in using a notebook as a memory device. As a scientist and a NGO member he was engaged with others in common cognitively based enterprises that made him a part of a larger cognitive whole whose ends and means of

organism and group provide a better model for understanding and explaining WE-ness forms of 3E-ness and its origin than does Clark's implicit gene-centered model.

IV. The Origin of WE-ness

In a recent paper Samir Okasha has attempted to formulate an evolutionary criterion for the movement from individual level selection to multi-level selection.¹⁹ Okasha illustrates the criterion for the emergence of

become parts of something else that does have its own intrinsic ends.²² A new Darwinian entity has emerged at a higher biological level. In the case studied by Michod and considered by Okasha, a multi-celled organism has emerged from a group of single

Let us call these group human cognitive achievements cognitive *enhancements*. The WE-ness hypothesis is one possible explanation of this phenomenon. But there are other competing explanations that invoke different sorts of understanding of these group products.

I turn now to findings in developmental psychology indicating that humans' capacity for we-intentionality helps to explain their distinctive cultural and social achievements.

intentionality.” This “shared intentionality [is], most basically, the ability to create with others joint intentions and joint commitments in cooperative endeavors.”³⁰

conformity as well as the performance of actions aimed at identifying the actor with a group, initially with the person's significant others, parents, family and schoolmates and then larger cultural groups.³⁵ We-intentionality then involves and fosters both a kind of group identity and social rationality that operates along with social pressures of various kinds.^{36 37}

Thus, on Tomasello's hypothesis, it is we-intentionality (featuring both normativity and a

VII. Conclusion

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⁶ More prec

Griffiths, *Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).

¹⁷ Humans come with epistemic embedding capacities and learn to develop even more of them. Confer Kim Sterelny, *Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2003).

¹⁸ J. Maynard Smith and E. Szathmary, *The Major Transitions in Evolution* (Oxford: Freeman, 1995). Confer also Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, *Unto Others: the Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

¹⁹ Samir Okasha, "Individuals, groups

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