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 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 5}$  It excludes, for instance, fixations and unconscious beliefs.

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Logic Matters.

Handbook of Logic and Language

Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality.

Philosopher's Imprint

Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge

Rödl Self-Consciousness

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Anscombe

Α	A PARTIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF BELIEF & AN IMPLIED FEATURE OF KNOWLEDGE OF BELIEF
1.	forms of inquiry into one's own mental states: theoretical:

## interaction of the two variables

	mediate learning	immediate learning
believer himself figures as object of experience (sense #1)	1. not applicable	4. right combination
believer himself figures as source of testimony (sense #2)	2. not applicable	5. implausible
believer himself does not figure	3. implausible	6. implausible

## C IMPLICATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE OF BELIEF

3.

- 1. An aspect of learning a person's state from his assertion is that the hearer thinks of the speaker as attending deliberatively to that state.
- 2. The learner's taking the state she learns through the speaker's assertion to be one to which he attends deliberatively is a manifestation of any belief-ascriber's conceiving of the person to whom she ascribes belief as deliberatively related to his state.
- 3. That a person who learns the state expressed in an assertion takes the speaker to attend deliberatively to that state is explained by the fact that the state expressed in assertion is belief.
- 4. methodological question: Why think the details of a particular way of learning belief can support or undermine a thesis about knowledge of belief in general?
  - My claim about knowledge of belief: Knowledge of belief involves conceiving of the believer as deliberatively related to his state.
  - Some ways of learning belief involve being confronted with the believer's attending to his own state.
  - So, prediction: Any way of learning a person's belief from some form of attention he brings to it should involve his attending to it deliberatively.
- 5. Alternative explanation of the fact that a person who learns the state expressed in an assertion takes the speaker to attend deliberatively to that state:
  - Belief is logically independent of the believer's reflective relation to it.
  - Assertion is a way of attending to one's belief that is deliberative.
  - Thus, any belief learned through assertion will be known to be one to which the speaker attends deliberatively.
  - This explanation yields two frustrated expectations:
    - There should be ways of learning a person's belief from him that involve his attending theoretically to the state.
    - In seeking to know a person's belief, we should be able to appeal to him as a theoretical inquirer into his state.