Reshef Agam-Segal (Auburn University)
Secondary Senses: Self-Legislation and Other Figurative Dramas

Plato, Aristotle, and Kant faced a similar problem. They held that the soul was a basic unity, but talked about different parts in the soul. Kant, in particular, wrote about the noumenal part of us that legislates to

H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)
What, Me Worry?: Selves, Cohabitation, and the Problem of the Many

According to what Rebecca Roach calls *the common sense view,* what matters for survival is identity. Rebecca Roache suggests that David Lewis' response to Parfit in defense of the common-sense view fails because, given the character of personnel involved in branching cases, we cannot infer that what matters for their survival is what matters for us. While pre-fission stage-sharing allows persons to survive fission, such cases tell us nothing about what matters for survival for ordinary people or about the

Therese Scarpelli Cory (Seattle University)

relation, and does not require Lewis to make some unnatural claims about the I

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that these are incompatible. Just as there are problems accounting for the identity of genuine selves which motivate the move towards NCS, there are problems accounting for the identity of characters in narratives.

Benjamin Visscher Hole IV (University of Washington)
Nussbaum on Moral Perception and the Priority of the Particular

Martha Nussbaum's account of moral perception holds that we perceive moral particulars prior to ethical principles. First, I explain her account. Second, I present a dilemma: our perception of moral particulars is either non-inferential or it is inferential. If Nussbaum accepts a non-inferential interpretation, then she is vulnerable to an unsavory position on moral epistemology – one that invites intuitionism and further invites relativism. But if she accepts a non-inferential account, then the moral particular is not prior to the ethical principle. I suggest that her better option is to grab the second horn. This move avoids the problems of the first horn without sacrificing her neo-Aristoelian commitments or her overarching view that literature plays an ineliminable role in moral enquiry. At the same time, this move renders her priority thesis trivial.

Robert J. Howell (Southern Methodist University)
The Hard Problem of the Self

James Jeffries (The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Owning and the Creation of Individual Selves

If we suppose familiarity with cases in which some ideas seem to be our own and other ideas seem to belong to someone else, then we generate a problem for an adequate conception of the individual self. Both my ideas and the ideas of others occupy a place in a single mental life (mine), and we must discover some basis for this mental distinction. I draw on the work of Max Scheler to demonstrate that a traditional, broadly Cartesian account of selfhood cannot accommodate this distinction. I then turn to Scheler's description of immediate, shared experience, in virtue of which an individual self is gradually discovered. I criticize the descriptive adequacy of this view, its reliance on an essentialist account of personhood, and its consequent limitation to epistemological claims. Alternatively, I describe immediate experience as disjoint and discontinuous, and argue for an a posteriori conception of the individual.

Justin Kalef (Vancouver Island University)
A 'Parallel Arguments' Response to Harman's Case for Appraiser Relativism

In this paper, I critically examine Gilbert Harman's case for appraiser relativism. I first clarify the
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David Krueger (University at Albany, SUNY)
Hume's Fictional Impression of Self

Jacob Longshore (University of Portland)
Pierce, The Self, and the Self-Dialogue of Thought

Plato understands thought as a conversation with oneself; C.S. Peirce agrees with this. What does it mean, to talk to yourself? How is it possible? I examine Peirce's concept of self and thinking in order to answer these questions. Peirce views thinking as an operation of signs that are geared toward future conduct. One idea triggers several other ones, which can then serve to determine how you act. Thinking is an operation of signs, none of which determine themselves. A child discovers herself after checking conflicting testimonies against experience; to explain ignorance and error revealed by this event, she posits the idea of self. The self serves a corrective function, for it enables one to identify other facts and submit them to testing. I therefore suggest that thinking, as self-dialogue, involves positing a future self. Self-correction is possible by testing multiple testimonies of one's own.

Fauve Lybaert (University of Leuven, Belgium)
An exposition and evaluation of Edmund Husserl's answer to the question 'Is it essential to self-consciousness that I situate myself in an intersubjectively shared space and time?'

When I am aware of my diachronic existence, do I then necessarily refer to myself as being an objective particular that is in principle traceable by others in an intersubjectively shared space and time? This is the question that I here wish to pose. I probe it through an evaluation of Edmund Husserl's claim that there could be a consciousness that individuates and unifies itself even if there were no nature or idea of nature. I contest this claim by raising questions that bring out how the constitution of our self-consciousness depends on our capacity to situate ourselves in an objective space and time.

Bertha Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)
Cloning, Identity, and Human Dignity: A Response to Callahan and Kass

One of the most pervasive arguments against human reproductive cloning is that genetic duplication will rob the resulting clone of a unique identity (Callahan) or an open future (Kass). This is because cloning "creates serious issues of identity and individuality… [the child] will be saddled with a genotype that has already lived. People are likely to compare his performances in life with that of his alter ego." This objection can be read in two ways. First, the cloned child is destined to repeat the life of his genetic predecessor and so would be robbed of a chance of living her own unique life. Or, second, although the cloned child would want to live her own unique life, society's expectations that she repeat the life of her genetic predecessors would be so strong as to deny her this important opportunity. Because this harms the resulting child, cloning is intrinsically wrong. I will argue that neither of these two objections are successful against the morality of human cloning, mostly because both Kass and Callahan underestimate the role of nurture for forming unique identity. Moreover, there is ample evidence, both from the human population and the feline population, that the genetic repetition of an individual mammal does not repeat identity. Monozygotic multiples certainly illustrate this point; along with CC the cat, the first cloned feline, who neither acts nor looks like her genetic predecessor. Conversely, philosophers who argue this point against Callahan and Kass overemphasize nurture at the expense of acknowledging that genetics does indeed play an important role in forming our identity. The main issue is whether even mild duplication of psychological traits in a cloned child is sufficient to rob her of her identity. Kass and Callahan seem to think it does. I will argue that it does not.

Tuomas Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)
Constitution View and the Ontological Uniqueness of Persons

According to Lynne Rudder Baker's constitution view of personhood, human persons are ontologically unique beings that are constituted by human organisms. What makes human persons unique is their first-person perspective of the world; having this perspective allows human persons to stand in moral, interpretive, and ontologically productive relations to the world. But which human organisms constitute

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and accident. While I do not offer a positive account of explanatory understanding, the considerations that I advance support the idea that there is a distinctive sense of explanatory understanding.

Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State University)
Is Hegel an Unwitting Humean?

Hegel is famously critical of Kant's claim that pure reason can legislate for the will; more specifically, he is critical of the claim that moral deliberation requires radically stepping back from everything empirical about ourselves. The question I take up in this paper is whether this criticism places Hegel in familiar territory occupied by Humeans. If deliberation does not involve radically stepping back from everything that is particular about ourselves, then must normative claims, specifically reasons for action, have their source in desires? This question is of vital importance not only for Kantian and Humean ethics, but also for any attempt to develop a distinctively Hegelian approach in ethics. I sketch a Hegelian response to two distinct Humean claims about reasons and desires. This response rejects normative Humeanism but advances an amended version of motivational Humeanism.

Nicholas Parkinson (Stony Brook University)
The Fragmentation of Self in Photography: Gadamer and Milja Laurila's Images of Forgetting

The purpose of this paper is to explore Gadamer's notion of the continuity of self-understanding through art by presenting contemporary Finnish photographer Milja Laurila's work as both an illustration of and a challen-4 (o) -8 ( ) 1 0 0 41 0MT 411 Lo csealle(s) -6(e) -7aita-4 (i) Plaontrork

Joshua Rasmussen (University of Notre Dame)
A Theory of Correspondence

A common view of *truth* is that truths reflect the way the world is. That is, truth consists in a relationship between that which is true and the world (or parts of it). This relationship is typically called *correspondence* (hence, *the correspondence theory of truth*). But philosophers have so far failed to spell out in precise terms just what the relation of correspondence *is*. Only a handful of proposals have been offered, and each of these makes use of undefined technical terms. Therefore, I offer a precise analysis of the correspondence relation. The analysis is valuable because it explains *how* a proposition could correspond to something as well as *why* propositions correspond to the things they do.

Carolyn Richardson (University of Toronto)
Learning Belief from Assertion

The paper consists in a defence of a thesis assigning a feature to knowledge of belief: to ascribe a belief to someone is to take him to be deliberatively related to the state ascribed. I first offer a partial characterization of belief as a state to which its bearer is deliberatively related; implied is the thesis about knowledge of belief. I then develop an account of a specific way in which we learn one another's beliefs: from assertion. When we ascribe belief to another based on his assertoric speech, I argue, we take him to attend deliberatively to the state in question. Rather than being a peculiarity of that specific means of learning belief, the ascriber's taking the speaker to attend deliberatively to the state ascribed manifests a feature of knowledge of belief as such.

Aaron Rodriguez (University of Oregon)
Hanging by a Narrative Thread: Dewey and Rorty on Aesthetic Self-Creation

In defending Rorty's account of self-creation, specifically his notion of a "poetic ironist," it soon becomes apparent that his aestheticized ethics is somewhat lacking. In particular, it is unclear if and how experiencing the organization of a work of art might actually be of use for us as we weave together our own self-narratives. Fortunately, one of Rorty's intellectual heroes, John Dewey, articulates a wonderfully rich aesthetic theory that serves as an illuminating supplement to the former's figure of the "strong poet." Through the lens of Dewey's views on art, then, we see just how aesthetic experience can help us recuperate our fragmented selves by awakening us to the wealth of possibilities available for our self-creative projects.

Luke Roelofs (University of Toronto)
Consciousness in Spinoza: What is it like to be God?

Spinoza makes several striking claims about mentality, such as that all things possess it, and that human minds are merely ideas in the infinite mind of God. But these claims come without a developed account of first-person consciousness, which has led to confusion and interpretive dispute. I try to cast new light on this issue by making use of Ned Block's distinction between 'Access Consciousness', a functional availability of contents for higher-level processes, and 'Phenomenal Consciousness', the irreducible 'how-it-feels' of experience. I draw several parallels be

William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis and Clark College)
Extending the Extended Mind: The Phenomenon of WE-ness

Advocates of cognitive extension argue that the human mind super-sizes itself by embodying itself in a body, embedding itself in an epistemically agential environment and uniting itself with both in extended cognitive agency. Call this the 3E-ness thesis. In this paper, I propose a strong version of 3E-ness, WE-ness: In some instances super-sizing results in the creation of a plural subject, a WE. I outline the ontological lineaments of WE-ness distinguishing it from other types of 3E-ness and suggest an evolutionary biological model of its origin based on the emergence of multi-cellular life from single celled-life. And I then turn to some findings in developmental psychology concerning we-intentionality and its features of normative and supra-personal intentionality. Finally, on the basis of these findings, I indicate briefly why a WE-ness account of group agency is superior to two leading competitors, summative and transcendental social constructionist accounts.

Dan Ryder (University of British Columbia, Okanagan)
Teleosemantics and Swampman: Defanging an intuition

Teleosemantics is a very promising strategy for naturalizing intentionality, but the infamous Swampman example strongly inhibits its adoption. In this paper, I argue that an empirically plausible model of how the brain works has some consequences which show thl e

Jeff Snapper (University of Notre Dame)

Janna van Grunsven (The New School for Social Research)
Two Forms of Deliberation - McDowell and Dreyfus on Responsibility in Aristotelian Phronesis

John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus have been involved in a debate concerned with the question of whether our basic everyday actions are non-